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im Grunde die lebendigste und wirkungsvollste Lebensmacht ist. Sein reiner Glaube an die ewigen Werte ergriff die tiefste Seele des Volkes." But Fichte's idealism presently sank into disrepute, overwhelmed by the positivism of natural science. There was only one world, the world of observed fact; and all the 'riddles of the universe' were set by that and must be answered, if they could be answered at all, in terms of science itself, of elements and laws of occurrence. Then came the inevitable reaction against positivism, and the steady trend towards epistemology and away from metaphysics, that are characteristic of current philosophical thinking. Facts in themselves become tiresome; the thinker turns "zur Erkenntnisfrage, zur Frage nach dem Wert der wissenschaftlichen Behauptung;" he begins to enquire "nach Sinn und Bedeutung." So the concept of *value* is brought to the forefront of philosophical interest. A mere "Umwertung der Werte" is, however, not enough: we must, says Professor Münsterberg, push our investigation to "das tiefste Wesen der Bewertung." "Die Gesamtheit der Werte muss grundsätzlich geprüft und aus einer Grundtat einheitlich abgeleitet werden." What our latter-day philosophy lacks is "ein in sich geschlossenes System der reinen Werte;" only when we have this "kann die Philosophie auch wieder aufs neue zur wirklichen Lebensmacht werden, wie es zu lange ausschliesslich die Naturwissenschaft gewesen ist." Its provision is by no means easy, but rather a matter of keen and laborious thinking; it will not suffice "die grossen Gedanken des deutschen Idealismus noch einmal auszusprechen." Natural science has intervened; more especially "die Naturwissenschaft vom Seelischen, die Psychologie, hat ganz neue Ausblicke eröffnet; neue Wertgebiete des praktischen Lebens haben sich aufgetan; wir sind andere Menschen geworden." The day for reconstruction may, perhaps, not yet have arrived; but its arrival may be hastened.

In this spirit, the author lays before the public his own Philosophy of Values, which falls into two parts, a brief introductory theory of values and a system of values. The book is designed to turn our attention from laws to ideals, from the pleasurable and the useful to the sphere of pure duty, from material things to free will, from the world of facts to the world of eternal values. That it is a notable attempt goes without saying; it is the expression of a strongly marked personality, and shows a sustained fervor of conviction. Nevertheless, it is, in the fullest sense of the phrase, a "künstliches Denkgebilde;" and without running to the other extreme, of a raggedly pragmatic universe, we may surely say that the age of such systems is past. Individuals, men of like temperament with the author, will find in his pages inspiration and encouragement. All readers of the book will derive from it the benefit of a moral tonic. The circle of Professor Münsterberg's admirers will be increased. But that the doctrines which he sets forth will appeal, vitally and enduringly, to any large body of academic youth, whether in Germany or in the English-speaking world, seems hardly possible. The next reformation in thought must come from within the sciences, not from the external realm of concepts.

M. W. WISEMAN.

*The Philosophy of Loyalty*, by JOSIAH ROYCE. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1908. pp. xiii+409.

These lectures were first delivered in their present form before the Lowell Institute in the autumn of 1907, although their substance had been given in various places at other times. "It is simply an appeal to any reader who may be fond of ideals and who may also be willing to review his own ideals in a somewhat new light and in a philo-

sophical spirit," and its aim is to simplify the moral issues of the day, in which there is restlessness regarding the foundations of morality.

Loyalty is defined as "the willing and practical and thoroughgoing devotion of a person to a cause." It is never merely emotional, it involves self-control, and it has a social cause. It has value for the individual, because it frees him from doubts and unifies his life. By nature we have no personal will; we find our will in part by imitation, social conformity, and when this proves insufficient, we swing back to caprice, finding satisfaction in neither, until we weld both factors in loyalty to a cause, "So rich, so well knit and to him so fascinating and withal so kindly in its appeal to his natural self-will that he says to his cause, 'Thy will is mine and mine is thine. In thee I do not lose but find myself, living intensely in proportion as I live for thee.'"

The philosophy of loyalty agrees with individualism in recognizing that no impersonal theory can be successful, that each person is the centre of his own world and must have his own end. But it points out that the ends set by mere individualism do not solve the individual's problems. Mere self-assertion in any form, thinks Prof. Royce, is an empty and futile process, because there is no self until it is made concrete in social relations. On the other hand, mere subjection to social relations also destroys the self, so that our only way of realizing the self is to combine our individuality with society in the form of loyalty to a cause.

Such a cause must be one in which the person can realize himself fittingly, and this can happen only if it joins many persons into the unity of a single life. It must be both personal and super-personal. Loyalty to my cause must also help to sustain others in loyalty to theirs, and in so far as my cause prevents this, it is a bad cause. Loyalty to loyalty is the final end and standard in selecting our cause, for this is simply finding the harmony between self and the world in some practical work. Such a standard gives conscience a touchstone to decide doubtful cases by because it furnishes an ideal and thus virtually creates a self. In a conscientious person doubts arise when loyalties conflict with each other, and in such a case our principle of loyalty to loyalty says, "Choose that which is more loyal to loyalty. If you do not know which is the better cause, at least decide, even if you must do so ignorantly, and having chosen, abide by your choice with courage and loyalty. Even this is better than hesitancy."

Loyalty is the great need in America to-day, first to the family, and secondly to political institutions. The latter gives rise to an especially difficult problem because our country is so impersonal and big that it is hard for men to be loyal to it as of old. They are loyal, intensely so, to their class, but not to their country. We need a new provincialism, a loyalty to city, and to state, as a training for the wider loyalty to our country.

Training for loyalty begins in early childhood with the idealization of heroes; it is found to some degree in gangs, codes of honor and the like; at adolescence it crops out especially in fraternities and loyalty to one's own side or institution. These natural forms should be utilized and guided by wise leaders, towards an idealized cause which demands strain and sacrifice from its followers. Idealization of the cause is of all these the most important, as is seen in the fact that some of the "lost causes" have been those which have most influenced the world, such as the idealization and transformation of the Kingdom of Israel into the triumph of righteousness. Through the power of grief and imagination loyalty to such a cause is so heightened that the

man is stimulated to ever greater efforts and to a union of his cause with that of all loyal souls, with art and with religion.

Loyalty thus comes to appear as the service of a superpersonal cause, and involves a higher unity of consciousness than that of ordinary human individuality. That is, "the social will is a concrete entity, just as real as we are and of a still higher grade of reality than ourselves."

At this point Prof. Royce makes connection with his theory of the Absolute. The faith of the loyal has truth; a world of truth implies a world possessing a rational and spiritual unity, a conscious world of experience, whose type of consciousness is higher in its level than is the type of our human minds, but whose life is such that our life belongs as part to this living whole." He then proceeds to a criticism of Prof. James's statement of pragmatism.

James says, "'The true,' to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in our way of thinking, just as 'the right' is only the expedient in our way of behaving." "It pays for our ideas to be validated, verified. Our obligation to seek truth is part of our general obligation to do what pays. The payment true ideas bring is the sole why of our duty to follow them."

First of all Royce agrees that the search for truth is a practical activity with an ethical purpose, and that its attainment means a practical success in active undertakings. But what constitutes success? Surely not the success of the mere instant, not the expediency which views only to-day. James himself inserts the phrase "in the long run" to broaden his expediency and success. But when does a man experience all the facts about the long run? "To appeal to the genuinely real 'long run' is only to appeal in still another form to a certain ideally fair conspectus of my own whole life, a conspectus which I, in my private human experience never get." That is, the admission of the long run, means that we judge our success by some ideal,—which Royce seems to assume to be an Absolute—instead of by the instant.

That is, says Royce, upon the basis of our need for unity, we form ideas of what such a unity of experience is. If these ideas are true, "then such a unity does actually exist and is experienced in some conspectus of life which wins what we need, approves our loyalty, fulfills our rational will, and has in its wholeness what we seek. And then we ourselves with all our ideas and strivings are in and of this higher unity of life." This is an eternal truth. To deny this reality only reaffirms it in another form, saying that the whole truth is that there is no truth, and hence we derive the proof that truth and a real world actually exist.

Now this truth is simply the Eternal, conscious, united, self-possessed, and perfected through our devotion to it. Loyalty thus becomes "the will to believe in something eternal and to express that belief in the practical life of a human being," and success and concord with the truth come in so far as each person is in unity with this Eternal or world consciousness.

Prof. Royce's criticism that when Prof. James appeals to the long run he virtually appeals to an ideal conspectus, is indeed a valid one, and if the long run is carried out to its logical end, pragmatism must admit that the final practical testing of any act is never finished until the universe itself comes to an end. That is, pragmatism makes its appeal to faith as a principle of action, saying, "Be bold! Absolute truth is unattainable, and if man is to live at all, if he is to act at all, he can do so only by a prophecy of success and the effective faith in his prophecy that makes him act as if the prophecy were already a

fact." If the results are harmonious with the rest of his and other men's experiences, then *in so far* he has a guarantee of fact and truth, although theoretically the widening experience of mankind may put this particular act out of commission at some future time. The reviewer has not yet been able to see why any pragmatist may not have a completely worked out *theory* of an ideal world, perfection, and so on, which serves as his working hypothesis, but of which the *truth* is tested by every act, and which must be modified accordingly.

This, however, is far from saying that such an ideal or that any ideal is a *fact* outside of individual experiences or that there is an *actually existent* objective unity of experiences, of which each person's individual life is only a fragment. It is difficult to see upon what grounds Prof. Royce makes such an assumption. The person who denies such a reality does not need to affirm that the whole truth is that there is no truth. He may say that assertions about "the whole truth" can refer to facts only if they refer to the present totality of experiences—including, of course, all ideas and ideals, and that such "whole truth" develops with the development of life and mind. To assert that at each instant there must be somewhere a conscious unity of all experiences is surely an assumption which rests upon the pragmatic motive of the individual's need for it in order to unify his own thinking. As such it may be altogether justifiable, but it should be held as an assumption and not as a demonstrated fact.

Considering the book as a whole, it will doubtless appeal to a large class of readers who stand in just such need as the author mentions of some stimulus to deepen and make more serious their moral lives. There is a great deal of repetition, not only of phrases but even of paragraphs and almost of pages, but this may be of value in fixing the few fundamental ideas which the author is trying to enforce.

AMY E. TANNER.

*Etudes d'Histoire et de Psychologie du Mysticisme*, Les grands mystiques chrétiens par HENRI DELACROIX. Paris, F. Alcan, 1908. pp. 470.

For this psychological study M. Delacroix selects Saint Theresa as a representative of the Spanish mystics of the sixteenth century, Madame Guyon, of the French mystics of the seventeenth, and Suso, of the German mystics of the fourteenth. He selects these three especially because they have left letters and autobiographical writings freer from doctrinal taint and with more pure introspection than have some other and perhaps better known mystics.

The mystic is a person who believes that he apprehends immediately and internally the divine presence. His tendency is complementary to if not opposed to rationalism. It is usually based upon or in ascetism and self-renunciation in various forms, and is marked by passivity, a sense of the divine presence, and loss or enfeeblement of the feeling of self and its mental functions. In its most typical forms it passes through three stages: a stage of exaltation, of various degrees, from contemplation up to complete trance, which is only temporary and which holds the mystic passive; second, one of sorrow or pain, intensified by the contrast with the previous state and corresponding somewhat to the modern "conviction of sin;" and third, a permanent consciousness of divinity, which is not characterized by trance visions, or any of the other somewhat abnormal marks of the first state, and which heightens the mystic's bodily health and powers and makes him able to deal with all sorts of practical problems to a greater degree than before. The first stage is not uncommon, the author believes, and is found often in persons of marked hysterical tendencies. It is often brought on or heightened by fasting and bodily